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Introduction 
 
Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer 
 
Enzo Traverso has recently remarked on the proliferation of memory issues. Quoting the title of a 
book by Régine Robin, La mémoire saturée, he writes of the ‘overabundant, saturated memory that is 
marking out [world] space’ (Robin, 2003; Traverso, 2005, p.11). We would observe instead that there 
have never been so many social science studies of memory, and that what has been saturated is not 
memory but the social sciences that study it. Nonetheless, memory issues are abundant; they take 
many shapes; many are recent and some quite unprecedented. And in European memory games, four 
strong trends, none of which have yet been explored in depth in the social sciences, may be identified.  
The first may be defined as ‘intensive reconciliationism’ and refers to international circulation of 
‘grammars’ of reconciliation in the sense given to the concept of grammar by Luc Boltanski and 
Laurent Thévenot (1991: 93). Reference is to a set of relations between former oppressors and victims 
that includes acts of crime confession, requests for pardon, and official consent to pardon, a model 
illustrating how a past made up of violent acts and inimical relations can be settled peaceably after exit 
from an authoritarian regime. Circulation of reconciliation grammars is made possible by modern 
technologies and the opening up of what were once compartmentalized geopolitical spaces.1 In an 
overall context of increased criminalization of groups and individuals responsible for violence and an 
increased tendency to handle those issues in courts of law, what we actually see developing are 
‘pardon policies’ (Lefranc, 2004, Wigura, 2011) and ‘apology diplomacy’ (Sémelin, 2008) together 
with an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral historian commissions (Bazin, 2007, Lefranc, 
2006).  
This trend stands in direct contrast to a second process, wherein conflictual memory is reactivated and 
memory-related representations used politically either to stigmatize or discredit a political opponent 
or, more broadly, to reopen a historical ‘case’ in hopes of changing the verdict (Mink and Neumayer, 
2007, Mink and Bonnard, 2010, Blaive et al., 2011). An example here are the claims made during 
European Union enlargement in 2004 with regard to populations expelled from the Sudeten area, 
eastern Poland and Silesia in the aftermath of the Second World War. The fact that expelled Germans 
or their descendants began publicly brandishing their memory, the strategy being to disconnect their 
situation from the defeat of the Nazi armies (a move that amounts to disconnecting the effects of the 
war from its causes), demonstrates that what from 1960 to 1990 seemed definitively stabilized power 
relations—stabilized by means of a moral or normative approach to the conflictual past—are in fact 
subject to context-determined fluctuation (Blaive and Mink, 2003, Neumayer, 2007a). 
Third, in all European countries the number of legally and normatively framed ‘memory policies’ are 
increasing. These policies do not aim to improve bilateral relations or foster European integration but 
rather to mobilize the electorate of a given party or coalition around what may be described as 
symbolic yet bellicose identity demands, demands put forward in internal political arenas but also 
addressed to the world at large. This ‘net’ of laws is particularly tight-woven in France (Andrieu et al., 
2006, Nora and Chandernagor, 2008, Michel, 2010, Gensburger, 2010), where ‘competition among 
victims’ is said to have led to ‘memory wars’ (Chaumont, 1997, Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson, 2008, 
Lefranc and Mathieu, 2009). But the phenomenon is hardly restricted to French society. Often, in 
modern societies, those who govern are yielding to the temptation to ‘use the dead to govern the 
living.’ (Mink, 2010). For example, Poland's Law and Justice-led government in power from 2005 to 
2007 forged the concept of ‘history policies’ to justify state intervention in interpretation of historical 
facts, and in 2009 the president of the Russian Federation, declaring history to be an attribute of 
national ‘sovereignty’, set up a ‘Presidential Commission to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the 
Detriment of Russia's Interests’ for the purpose of countering symbolic European initiatives to 
establish an official equivalence between Stalinism and Nazism.2 
The fourth and last development amounts to extracting or shifting memory games from the national 
framework to extra-national arenas, the aim being to combine various political resources for partisan 
competitions by making use of new international and above all European norms and the normative 
conditionality developed by the European Union and the Council of Europe (Mink, 2005, Mink, 2007, 
Neumayer, 2007a). The end of the Cold War radically changed the way European Union authorities 
handle history, redefining the economy of constraints and resources available to them in this area. In 
the 1950s and 1970s respectively, the Council of Europe and the European Community and later 
Union began implementing a set of policies aimed at rendering explicit or bolstering a supposed 
‘European identity.’ Reasoning by analogy with nation-state formation, those authorities considered 
the past a particularly valuable resource for the collective identification processes that are crucial to 
the constitution of a political community and the legitimizing of a supranational system of government 
(Shore, 2000, Stråth, 2002, Déloye, 2006, Geremek and Picht, 2007). But the end of the East-West 
confrontation and the reassessments of the past done in the former Eastern bloc changed the meaning 
of transnational memory policies, for the point now was not only to bring to the fore a shared history 
and values but also to find ways to meet the many demands for recognition and reparation of past 
crimes and injustices.  
Three consecutive ‘memory regimes’ have been identified as being operative in post-1945 Western 
Europe, and it is important to present them briefly in order to understand the recent resurgence of 
memory issues.3 Immediately after the war and up to the 1970s, the dominant understanding was that 
the Germans alone were guilty of the atrocities committed during the Second World War, the corollary 
of this being the myth of resistance and the uncontested ‘victim’ status of Nazi-occupied countries. In 
the 1970s, what came to the fore was memory of the Holocaust as a symbol of the barbarity against 
which European unity had to be strengthened (Judt, 2002). More complex analyses  have pointed up 
the difficulties that European Union authorities were encountering in their attempt to produce a 
‘narrative of origins’ capable of functioning as a viable alternative to the ‘national narratives’ they 
were helping to deconstruct. According to some authors, the fragile foundations of the European 
political community mean that it is forced to oscillate between a short-term vision of history based on 
an enchanted narrative of the continental stability ensured by post-1945 interstate cooperation and 
commemorations of a grim past dominated by the Holocaust and conflict among nations (Rosoux, 
2007, Rousso, 2009). The third phase began after the Cold War, when competing memory regimes 
originating in the eastern part of the continent began calling into question the afore-cited official 
representations of the past, producing a kind of ‘memory gap’ that can be seen at three levels. First 
there are the vast ‘blanks’ in Western European memory: thoroughgoing ignorance of at least some of 
the crimes committed in areas under communist control, populations expulsions and post-war border 
shifts, extremely violent episodes of World War II that occurred in the east. Second, in certain East 
European memories the massive repressions of the Stalinist period have a comparable (if not 
equivalent) status to the Holocaust, and this calls into question the Western postulate of the 
exceptional nature of the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews. Lastly, there are sharply contrasting 
representations of the symbolic date of 1945: for Western Europeans it marked the return to 
democracy and prosperity, whereas in the East it is likely to mark ‘the shift from one occupation to 
another’ (Judt, 2005, Droit, 2007, Mink, 2008, Rousso, 2009, Traverso, 2009, Stråth and Pakier, 2010, 
Blaive et al., 2011).  
Despite (or perhaps because of) the EU’s routine policy of encouraging reconciliation acts and 
arrangements (Neumayer, 2007b), Europe now encompasses memory issues that do not rotate around 
the ‘axis’ of Germany, though those issues are still dominant. The space of memory has not yet been 
stabilised in post-communist Europe, and its fault lines constitute memory veins that offer multiple 
resources. Memory of the pre-communist past is appealed to primarily through opposition to 
communism (patriotic acts and anti-communist resistance). Since 1989 the general tendency has been 
to check the pasts of zealous regime agents so as to remove anyone responsible for state crimes from 
positions of power, and to de-communise institutional structures while teaching the ill deeds of 
communism to the new generations. Policies are applied in various ways. On the institutional side, 
there are lustration laws for people and de-communisation laws for structures. The effects of these 
laws are reinforced by public socialisation and information policies and by the creation of archives for 
managing documents produced by repressive apparatuses of communist regimes. At the level of social 
relations, there are citizen interactions (victim associations), unregulated actions (organised leaks of 
lists of persons who collaborated with the political police), expert communities and their scientific 
studies, and interference in the historical field from journalist, judge, and MP ‘intruders’. In no post-
communist country today is there consensus on definitively closing the ‘file’ of the communist past. 
On the contrary, the impression is that the importance of that past for political life is growing with 
time precisely because its moral and socio-political consequences have not really been checked, 
resolved or overcome (Mayer, 2003, Lavabre and Mayer, 2006, Findor et al., 2008, Combe, 2009). 
This work focuses on such memory games, exploring how political and social actors see and ‘relate to’ 
certain historical events through the prism of how those same actors construct their identities, interests 
and strategies. Though the concepts ‘history’ and ‘memory’ should be distinguished from each other 
analytically, it is also important not to set up an opposition between the two as is commonly done. 
While history is a matter of science and memory of experience, memory-generated representations and 
historical studies do influence each other; memory understood as a set of representations of what 
seems to have occurred does affect academic accounts of what occurred (Blanchard and Veyrat-
Masson, 2008, p.27)—as scrupulous historians working to produce accounts that comply with pre-
established, corporation-shared rules are the first to acknowledge. All the chapters in this book share 
an extensive definition of memory as encompassing present political uses of history and the 
development of collective forms of remembering the past. Moving beyond factual or normative 
analyses of public policies around and political uses of memory, the authors focus on the many 
political and social processes that determine the chronology and characteristics of memory related 
policies and politics. In contrast to the narrow meaning of ‘transitional justice,’ where the priority is to 
analyze the preferences and tactics of a small circle of political and administrative elites, this book 
situates conflicts around painful histories within the ‘ordinary’ operating of post-communist societies, 
concentrating on games played by institutional actors (parties, elected officials, governments), 
mobilized social groups (former prisoners, groups making pilgrimages to battlefields or martyrdom 
sites, immigrants) and professional groups (historians and archivists, journalists). 
 
Existing literature on ties between memory of the past and political and social developments in post-
communist Europe has outlined a set of research avenues that this book purports to pursue—in two 
directions. First, some of that literature downplays the variety of actors who have appeared in the 
memory ‘field.’ Above all, it downplays their clear connections to partisan politics. By way of 
contrast, this book examines individuals and groups who have chosen to engage in political contests 
and use the symbolic past to confront their political competitors. Second, most studies of memory 
games in post-communist Europe adopt a national analytic framework, the assumption being that 
European Union political space is merely the environment of fundamentally endogenous processes. A 
few studies take into account the bilateral dimension of some memory policies, pointing out the impact 
of conflicts about the past on post-communist states’ foreign policy (Müller, 2002, Eder and Spohn, 
2005, Onken, 2007). Other analyses focus on the way Central European government actors have 
complied—either willingly or under constraint—with European Union or Council of Europe 
injunctions in a context of normative conditionality favorable to eastward exportation of Western 
memory regimes (Bonnard and Meckl, 2007, Droit, 2007, Mink, 2010, Neumayer, 2010). Building on 
those ideas, this book tries to account for how memory issues get torn out of their national frameworks 
and exploited in several arenas, internal and external, to increase their political resource yield. The 
chapters by Fainberg, Bonnard, Perchoc, and Neumayer analyze in detail how reconciliation norms get 
circulated internationally by way of European organizations and NGOs. The geopolitical dimension of 
post-communist ‘wounded memories’ and ’reconciliation policies’ is therefore a central concern of the 
research presented here. 
In the new framework that emerged in post-Cold War Europe, opportunities and constraints have 
come into being that brought social memory issues to the fore and enabled the actors using them to be 
favourably heard. Moves to internationalize memory issues, meanwhile, make clear how paradigms 
aiming to explain national situations end in stalemate.  
 
Three paradigms, linked in turn to the three disciplines of sociology, philosophy and history, have 
dominated social science study of memory4. The first belongs to sociological tradition. Maurice 
Halbwachs’ ideas on ‘social frames’ of memory and the production thereof (1994 [1925], 1997 
[1950])—i.e. transmission of the memory tie and construction of collective social memory—were later 
critically refined by Roger Bastide (1960). The key concepts here are ‘collective memory,’ group 
memory and the social frames of memory. The primary concern is to identify the social conditions that 
allow for developing and transmitting memory representations that will create group cohesion. The 
second paradigm is Paul Ricoeur’s normative paradigm, which emphasizes the work of memory 
(obliteration, overvaluing, labour), infers good and bad uses of memory, and opposes the bad ones. 
This approach distinguishes between ‘clinical and ... therapeutic categories borrowed principally from 
psychoanalysis’ and ‘forms of the manipulation or instrumentalization of memory’ (Ricoeur, 2004, 
p.69)—what Ricoeur calls ‘abuses of memory’ (blocked memory and forced memory) and ‘forgetting’ 
(omission, negligence and blindness). Above all, there is the dimension that the author defines as 
‘explicitly ethico-political,’ the only one he approves of: the ‘duty of memory’ (Ricoeur, 2004, p.69 
[2000, p.83]). The third paradigm is used in the discipline of history and was diffused with great 
success by Pierre Nora by way of the ground-breaking collective work he edited, Les lieux de mémoire 
(1984 [translated into English as Realms of Memory, 1997]). This paradigm relates to places or 
‘realms’ that people identify with and around which memory references develop. There are still strong 
proponents of all three of these paradigms, and all have elicited further developments: Marie-Claude 
Lavabre’s renowned work (1996) is in line with Halbwachs’ thought; Tzvetan Todorov (2004) has 
worked in the tradition of Ricoeur, while Etienne François and Hagen Schultze (2007) have used the 
‘lieux de mémoire’ notion in a way similar to Nora’s.5 
However, a great number of memory phenomena cannot be explained by any of these approaches 
because they (the approaches) are caught in the ‘national framework’ impasse. Our purpose is to apply 
a new, multidisciplinary approach that will enrich existing perspectives of political sociology of 
memory, an approach combining traditional political science concerns (contentious politics, uses of 
various resources in political competitions) with, on the one hand, a sociological approach to 
international relations focused on actors’ games and empirical configurations of multi-level policy-
making and on the other, a cognitive approach to public policy encompassing the emergence of new 
‘referentials’, i.e. cognitive and normative frames that guide actors’ behaviour (Muller, 2005). The 
thinking here is fueled by three alternative concepts—historicizing strategies and actions; reactive 
memory; memory mines or “veins”—previously developed and presented by Georges Mink in his 
introductions to collective works (Mink, 2007, Mink, 2010), concepts more useful for understanding 
the dynamics of today’s memory games. Their relevance will be demonstrated in the following 
presentation by references to recent developments in the ‘Katyń affair.’ 
The concept of historicizing strategies—that is, strategies for historicising conflict-generating 
heritages—is used in several chapters, particularly those by Matonyte, Jouhanneau, Zhurzhenko and 
Rousselet, to understand the behaviour of actors implicated in memory games. The aim of such 
strategies may be to produce consensus and therefore pacified social relations or, on the contrary, to 
reopen certain aspects of a repressed history, in which case the desired effect is distinction, symbolic 
recognition and/or integration into national narratives. It may also be to escape responsibility for 
crimes by ‘erasing the traces of a criminal past’ (Mink, 2007). This is a variant of symbolic politics: 
the underlying conviction is that certain representations of historical facts, internalised through formal 
or informal socialisation (schooling, family), have the collective mobilisation potential to enable the 
group making strategic use of them to obtain the political influence it desires.  
History as fact established by scholars has always been used to legitimize or delegitimize. However, a 
recent wave of memory-centred social movements—sometimes qualified as ‘revisionist’ and always 
involving a ‘revisiting’ of the knowledge acquired by historical science—call into question the 
established legitimacy of certain memory representations, namely representations pertaining to the 
Second World War. This is due to a number of factors, including the end of the great ideological 
systems that allowed for the clear, seemingly immutable identifying of victims and persecutors, 
winners and losers, and the twofold temptation to equalize the victims on both sides and develop new 
historical categories and rankings. Moves to rewrite history are closely linked to subsequent 
generations’ arrival on the scene and what is known as the ‘archives revolution’.  
But if we wish to make sense of the remarkable increase in historicising discourse, we need to go 
beyond the discipline of history. Historians have expressed amazement at the fragility of their field 
and recent incursions into their professional monopoly (Hartog and Revel, 2003) when what this new 
situation requires above all is the analytic insight of political scientists and sociologists. Behind the 
prolific talk about History—i.e., an account constructed in compliance with a number of pre-
established rules ideally shared by all members of the historian corporation—the real issue is uses of 
historical representations and the new actors who develop and practice those uses. The idea of a past 
that returns—the belated return to certain painful pasts thought to have been ‘obliterated’—raises 
more questions for a political specialist than a historian, as shown by the example of France’s 
supposed ‘forgetting’ of Vichy for several decades after 1945. As Annie Collovald explains, ‘This 
episode of French political history has always been present in the social uses of various actors—
historians and politicians— with an interest in how it was interpreted, because from the outset it 
constituted an intellectual and practical resource for defining their position and supporting their 
readings of national history’ (Collovald, 2006). This seems an obvious point, and we may ask if it is 
not due to the fact that forgetting, too, is a strategy, whether conscious or not  (Robin, 2002), as is 
pointing a finger at certain actors for having tried to efface historical facts from social memory. The 
fact is that memory material that has been ‘forced into silence’ continues to be part of actors’ games 
even if, in the current situation, the only places it can survive are memory niches cultivated by 
particular, minority actors. Those forced to forget and those who force others to forget keep memory 
games going by using the constraint of silence to create a new space of interaction opportunities. 
 
The history of the effects of the Katyń massacre offers a vivid example. 6 The events were forced into 
oblivion by the lack of a memory site: Katyń was inaccessible almost until the end of the Soviet Union 
and the men killed there were excluded from official tributes to victims of the Second World War. 
This ‘obliteration’ strategy was thwarted by semi-underground remembrance actions carried out by the 
Poles under the very nose of the communist authorities. Sizeable candle-lit gatherings on All Saints’ 
Day around a symbolic grave for Katyń massacre victims in Warsaw’s Powązki cemetery amounted to 
a kind of guerilla battle between Warsaw inhabitants and the communist police throughout the 1980s. 
Several examples show that on the side of the victims and their descendants nothing has been 
forgotten. On the contrary, the rule is memory recuperation followed by action.  
To fuel memory games and the development of institutional arrangements for handling post-conflict 
periods—all of which produce complex actor networks—actors are increasingly likely to use 
representations of the past, especially if there is disagreement about that past. This of course raises the 
question of how profitable such strategic choices are, but profitability is hard to measure because 
actors choose empirically as a function of the profit and rewards they think they can obtain. Their 
moves are aimed to procure them a better political position or an election victory, designate and 
stigmatize an enemy, strengthen client relations, consolidate identity, etc. Their choices will 
necessarily correspond to immediate contexts that increase the probability of their reaching those 
goals. This is therefore a sort of economy of memory governed by the law of supply and demand, an 
economy where inflationary use of memory representations can actually ‘backfire,’ reducing or indeed 
nullifying the sought-after ‘added value.’ How operational a historicizing strategy is depends on the 
‘resonance’ it has for the memory of the targeted public.  
 
This leads to our second concept: reactive memory. The underlying argument of this book is that the 
distinction widely accepted in sociology between historical and ‘live’ memory (Lavabre, 1994) is not 
sufficient. What we investigate here is reactive memory, in the sense that actors who promote 
historicising strategies mean to achieve political effects by recycling profitable memory material 
(profitable in that it is emotionally charged and socially inculcated) in reaction to uncertain or 
conditional situations. What is interesting in collective memory defined as the ‘point of intersection 
between a set of representations of the past shared by individuals (memories and acquired knowledge) 
and seemingly definitive accounts of history—i.e. historical memory (as distinct from the science of 
history)’ (Lavabre, 1994) is precisely that it can be reactivated and invested with current issues. This 
means that the past only counts if it is in some way relevant to the strategies of present-day actors. 
Here we encounter the typology recently applied in international relations studies (Rosoux, 2001), 
with its distinction between the weight of the past—the past that people were subjected to—and the 
choice of a past: the past used to political ends. This is a useful distinction, but it loses its effect when 
we recall that the reason people choose to focus on certain components of the past is precisely that 
they weigh so heavily. People choose a certain past in order to use it and to profit by doing so.  
 
A return to the Katyń affair is instructive here. The airplane that crashed on 10 April 2010, killing the 
Polish president Lech Kaczyński, was on its way to Katyń.7 Several signs held up later at public 
meetings of the Kaczyński brothers' political party dared establish a connection between the two 
events, calling them ‘Katyń 1’ and ‘Katyń 2,’ as if the very mention of the place-name should reopen a 
‘wound in memory.’ The Katyń massacre, together with the Soviets' lie about it and Soviet efforts to 
erase the facts, symbolizes successive layers of Polish-Russian historical conflict and lends itself to 
virtually continuous exploitation by way of historicizing strategies, be they aimed at reconciliation or 
conflictual division. This time that painful bilateral Polish-Russian past was caught up in a complex 
diplomatic context, since the Russians had already begun sending positive reconciliation signs when 
the plane crashed. The fact is that reconciliation between the two countries would deprive the 
Russophobic segment of the Polish elite of their role as ‘doorkeeper’ to the European Union, and this 
in turn increases the ‘yield’ on referring to a dual case of Polish martyrdom. Abusively relating the 
two events, which are of quite different natures yet occurred in the same place—and in ‘enemy’ 
territory—is a way of playing on a certain type of sentiment, precisely the type of emotional ‘fire’ that 
historicizing strategies seek to stoke.  
 
This example shows that analysis of memory issues in post-communist Europe requires a third 
conceptual perspective, and that perspective is taken in several chapters, particularly those by 
Kasperski, Zhurzhenko, and Fisli and Parot. Reactive memory is fueled by a particular type of memory 
‘realm,’ what we are calling memory mines, veins, seams; i.e., stocks of memory representations that 
can be exploited in social and political games. Europe is rife with ‘lieux de mémoire’ (Nora, 1984, 
Brossat et al., 1990, Nivat, 2007, François and Schultze, 2001 and 2007). According to Nora, these are 
places that enable feelings of identity and identification to crystallize. But they can also be reactivated 
for purposes of distinction. Reactivation proceeds either by dividing—i.e., reopening ‘wounds’ in the 
name of a need for distinction—or, on the contrary, preventing division by applying a vigorous 
therapy of reconciliation and pardon. In both cases, fossilised, fixed places of memory become live 
resource reservoirs, points of departure for new historicizing strategies whose purpose is to modify 
social reality and the settings in which those initiatives are staged. Because these ‘places’ are in fact 
dynamic, it might be preferable to speak of ‘veins’ or ‘seams’ of memory, a concept not inconsistent 
with that of ‘lieux de mémoire.’ The terms designate a symbol around which memory can rally, rather 
than a specific physical site. In the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of the 1940s there is Volhynia (a region 
where Poles were massacred) and the ‘Vistula action’, a synonym for the massacre and displacement 
of Ukrainians by Poles. Germans and Poles have their eyes trained on Silesia and Pomerania; Czechs 
and Germans on the Sudeten area; Poles on Katyń. However, legal documents such as the Beneš or 
Bierut decrees which provided the legal bases for population transfers at the end of the Second World 
War can also be rallying points for memory. For rightist parties in post-communist democracies, the 
‘roundtable talks’ at the close of the communist period are an inexhaustible vein of dissensus 
resources, despite the fact that they are attached to no particular geographical site. The Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact also functions as a reservoir of useful references for anti-Soviet actors, as is shown by 
Perchoc and Bonnard in this volume. Various actors draw the symbolic material needed to fuel 
political contests from just such ‘territorial or extra-territorial imaginaries’.  
 
The end of communism in Europe and to an even greater extent the successive Council of Europe and 
European Union enlargements to include former communist countries reactivated multiple memory 
veins. Exploiting them—either for the first time or once again—became profitable. Central and 
Eastern European countries’ exit from Soviet-type regimes changed the memory referential, in the 
sense that two occasionally concomitant context resources—conditionality and geopolitical 
asymmetry—worked to intensify memory issues and historicizing strategies and actions. 
Conditionality and geopolitical asymmetry were used as resources for dominating memory. New 
‘dominator/dominated’ configurations emerged in conjunction with mobilizations around memory, as 
is shown in the chapters by Perchoc, Bonnard, and Neumayer.  
 
Moreover, the clash between the European Union on the one hand, with its normative reconciliation 
principle and temptation to force memory to ‘unite’ around the uniqueness of the Holocaust as an 
integral part of the ‘acquis communautaire’, and the new member-states that emerged from the 
collapse of the Eastern bloc on the other, with their determination to get the experience of Soviet 
totalitarianism incorporated into the foundations of European historical legitimacy, constitutes a 
geopolitical asymmetry that in turn facilitates the pursuit of memory games.  
 
A crucial example here is the ‘betrayal at Yalta’ as the symbol of Western Europe’s abandonment of 
Eastern Europe to Soviet occupation. The ‘betrayal at Yalta’ is part of Eastern European reactive 
memory, and recycling it has appeared profitable to Central European politicians (Mink, 2008). This 
memory game extends beyond a hunt for electoral gains and the effects of internal political 
competitions. It is ‘part of the broader context of Eastern Europe’s demand for recognition of its 
history. ... To many politicians and specific populations, European history seems to have been written 
in Western Europe, and Western Europeans seem to deliberately ignore the sufferings caused during 
the Second World War by events that those same Western Europeans know virtually nothing about’ 
(Mink and Neumayer, 2009, p.86). Partisans of dogmatic ‘history policy’ have gone still further, 
mobilizing the argument of the West’s ‘debt’ to the East to justify demands for memory 
‘readjustments’ and reparations. To increase the profitability of this argument, they have emphasized 
the seeming opposition between today's ‘norms’ and historical ‘values,’ with the clear intention of 
making the West feel guilty. During the period that these countries were negotiating their entry into 
the European Union, the ‘historical debt’ argument was used in full to put maximum pressure on the 
EU (Neumayer, 2006). 
 
The historicizing game of appropriating the victory against the Nazis (see, for example, the 
disagreement on what date marks the end of the war: 8 May for Western Europeans, 9 May for the 
Russians) played at the 60th anniversary commemoration ceremonies also shows how this anniversary 
remains a legitimization card in geopolitical competitions and can be used to stimulate identity 
reflexes—‘Great Russia’ or anti-Russian depending on the country. In this case, East-West memory 
asymmetry actually undermines party solidarity, as can be seen in conjunction with the ‘Yalta 
resolution’ drafted to commemorate the end of the war. President of the European Parliament’s 
Socialist group Martin Schulz and his Estonian Socialist comrade Toomas Ilves had a heated exchange 
on the point, Schulz recalling that ‘the Red Army made it possible to defeat Nazism and end the 
Shoah’ while Ilves lamented the existence of ‘two visions of History’: ‘Westerners did not suffer as 
we did behind the Iron Curtain.’8  
 
The controversy around the equivalence between communism and Nazism—recognition that would 
justify the demand by many Central European political officials that the communist regime be 
officially defined in the same terms as the Nazi regime with all the legal consequences this would 
entail—offers yet another illustration of the complexity of demands for memory ‘readjustment.’ Since 
the early 1990s, having recourse to European Union normative authorities has had the effect of 
internationalizing the cause of de-communization, the aim being to prevent local excesses by applying 
a set of legal rights universalized by international conventions. It should be recalled that after 1989, 
each country pieced together its own legislation for excluding cadres of the former regime from its 
institutions and punishing persons responsible for ‘crimes committed in the name of that regime.’ As 
early as 1992, leftist (in many cases Communist) members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) decided to retaliate by neutralizing procedures for disqualifying 
collaborators of Central and Eastern Europe’s communist regimes. This in turn meant that 
historicizing strategies connected with the criminalization of the communist past had to play on two 
fields: national and international. The period was one of competition among victims and a race to get 
painful pasts legally recognized and perpetrators punished.  
 
The many later resurgences of this issue in both the EU Parliament and PACE show how persistent 
memory asymmetry allows for the pursuit of pressure strategies at the international scale. Indeed, the 
unity around memory policy postulated in all EU and Council of Europe documents is vulnerable to 
partisan splits inside European assemblies. Furthermore, the various parliamentary resolutions have 
not fully exhausted the memory vein of condemnation of the communist past, because their 
exclusively declarative nature means there have been no practical consequences to the official 
equating of the two totalitarian systems. This means that application laws can only be national and no 
universal or EU condemnation can be invoked to criminalize symbols of communism. In fact, 
partisans of the equivalence assertion need a universally agreed, normative condemnation of 
communism that they could align with the official condemnation of Nazism, whereas their adversaries 
are seeking at all costs to make communism a purely national issue and thereby disconnect the two 
scales (Mink, 2010). 
 
This collection of case studies purports to improve our understanding of the recent proliferation of 
memory games in post-communist Europe by highlighting two interrelated factors: the growing 
importance of non-state actors in memory games (alongside state bodies and politicians) and the 
variety of resources available to them despite domestic and external constraints that may restrict their 
use; the multiplication of arenas for engaging in remembrance politics and devising memory policies, 
arenas where demands for material or symbolic compensation are made in accordance with norms 
produced by European organizations. 
 
The volume is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on the role of new domestic political and social 
actors in memory games. Two chapters show how a variety of social groups involved in discussions 
about the past in specific national settings—the Bosnian former camp inmates studied by Jouhanneau 
and the Russian Orthodox Church analyzed by Rousselet— try to elaborate and impose memory 
norms into society. The remaining three chapters— Venken’s on the war memory of Soviet 
immigrants who settled in Belgium after World War II, Fisli and Parot’s on the pilgrimages to World 
War II memorials in Post-Soviet Russia, and Fainberg’s on the memorilization of the Jewish genocide 
in Ukraine —explore memory-related practices that challenge traditional narratives about the past both 
because they touch upon topics hitherto ignored by state bodies and because what they have to say is 
not in line with the content of those narratives. 
Although state actors are no longer the only players in memory games, they still play a crucial role and 
cannot be completely disregarded. Part II focuses on how political and administrative elites deal or fail 
to deal with the past. The first two chapters, Matonyte’s on Lithuania and Raimundo’s on Spain and 
Poland, highlight the internal diversity of elite conceptions of the former authoritarian regime, while 
Kasperski explores how a one-sided official historical narrative was imposed in Belarus. In the last 
chapter, Mink examines archivists and historians working for national memory institutes in Central 
European countries in order to illustrate the complex interplay between state bodies and sectors of 
civil society involved in memory issues. 
 
The case studies in Part III handle ‘geopolitics of memory,’ illustrating the multi-level nature of 
contemporary memory games. Zhurzhenko’s study of Polish-Ukrainian border regions provides rare 
insights into memory policies at the local level. The last four chapters analyze memory games at the 
transnational level, with three top-down studies of the production and uses of international norms—
Bonnard’s and Neumayer’s respective examinations of European standards for the protection of ethnic 
diversity and national minorities, Mouralis’s study of reunified Germany’s belated acceptance of 
international criminal law—and the bottom-up analysis by Perchoc of how the Baltic states use history 
to justify their foreign policy goals.  
 
The European continent is everywhere marked by traces of earlier interstate and ethnic conflicts. All 
those conflicts can always be reactivated, despite the different ways they were resolved in the past. 
Given this reality, various interest groups, political parties or states are constantly developing memory 
resources and incorporating historicizing strategies into their action repertories in the aim of 
‘recycling’ representations of painful pasts for use in current political games. These mobilizations run 
up against a tendency toward reconciliation that originates in civil society (e.g., informal groups or 
NGOs) and/or in national and international institutions that circulate ‘good’ (i.e., normative and 
normative-toned) models for pacifying resentments. All these arrangements work to produce 
legitimacy or non-legitimacy; in other words, to indicate what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for a nation in the 
international context. We hope to have made it clear here how memory studies would benefit from 
being included in recent changes in approaches to geopolitics and foreign policy, but the opposite is 
also true, and the many signs that memory games are being ‘transnationalized’ call for this adjustment. 
Memory-related phenomena are not a central issue in foreign policy, but they do have significant 
weight and are becoming an auxiliary component of it. 
 
As for the European Union, the change that took place in 2004 has only widened the gulf between 
West and East. The two halves of Europe do not share the same memory referential, and they are 
caught up in discordant time frames. Despite right-right, left-left transnational party alliances, we are 
only at the beginning of a long adjustment process that is as likely to regress as it is to progress. For 
the time being, ‘memory disunion’ constitutes a challenge to European Union construction, calling 
into question any excessive confidence in the virtue of political voluntarism.  
 
We should not close without at least mentioning the question of a political science of memory. The 
point is to determine whether, despite the apparent heterogeneity of the phenomena involved, 
historicizing games of division and reconciliation might be a good indicator of the state of political 
regimes and of so-called universal, established rules for pacifying conflicts and enabling yesterday’s 
belligerents to live together in the present.  
 
In studying social memory-related developments in Europe, we need to look beyond the fundamental 
tendency to move toward reconciliation and consensus, a tendency that developed in response to 
interethnic or interstate conflicts or authoritarian regimes related to the Second World War. It seems to 
us imperative to analyze the increasing number of dissensus games in countries engaged in 
constructing life after conflict. Experience shows that it is always possible to reactivate those conflicts, 
regardless of the various ways they were resolved in the past. Anyone wishing to push forward the 
construction of Europe and improve the way institutions handle post-conflict situations must reckon 
with all these phenomena, as they are constituent components of the axiological reality of European 
space. Until it is understood in Europe that the East’s memory games have specific content linked to 
the Second World War and Sovietisation, there can be no successful ‘Europeanisation’ of the histories 
of Europeans. This book aims to contribute to that broader endeavour. 
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1 The point here is to adapt the notion of ‘grammar’ so it can be used as a political construction that 
will endow the action of ‘beings and relations engaged in market ties’ with general meaning (Lefranc, 
2006). Sandrine Lefranc was the first to apply the concept to Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. 
The notion refers to a language-like system of operating rules and rules governing relations between 
the set of actors implicated in reconciliation, as well as a whole range of representations (Lefranc, 
2007). 
2 That same year, 2009, the European Parliament ruled that 23 August would henceforth be European 
Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism. 
3 We are using Johann Michel's definition of ‘memory regime’ as ‘the stabilized configuration of 
official public memory during a given historical period .… A memory regime resembles a cognitive 
framework; that is, a matrix of perceptions and representations of official public memory at a given 
period’ (Michel, 2010, p.16). 
4 We have limited ourselves here to paradigms developed by French authors. There is a kind of 
‘French touch’ to memory studies, and French thinkers’ contributions in this area are extensively used 
in the specialized literature. 
5 Paul Ricoeur’s typology has even been applied in international relations, where a classification of 
former belligerents’ uses of the past has been developed based on his triptych of obliteration, 
overvaluing, and labour (Rosoux, 2001). The analysis is limited to bilateral relations and the 
generation that actually engaged in combat. 
6 The forest around Katyń (in Russia) where the NKVD, on orders from Stalin and the CPSU 
Politburo, killed approximately 4,500 Polish army reserve officers in 1940 is the symbol of massacres 
of Polish elites perpetrated by the Soviet Union. In reality many more victims were put to death on 
several sites. Several thousand Polish POWs belonging to the country’s military elite were 
assassinated as they were transferred from the military camps  of Kozielsk, Strobielsk and Ostashov 
and from various Soviet prisons. 
7 The plane that crashed trying to land at the Smolensk military airport was carrying 96 persons highly 
representative of the Polish elite. In addition to the president and his wife, there were the four highest-
ranking army officers and a number of important MPs, not to mention descendants of officers 
murdered in 1940 in the forest of Katyń. All were in fact traveling to Katyń to participate in a 
ceremony commemorating the 70th anniversary of the massacre. 
8 Rafaële Rivais, ‘8 mai 1945: la « résolution Yalta » oppose les eurodéputés de l’Est et de l’Ouest,’ Le 
Monde, 6 May 2005. 
